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CLEMENCY AND PARDONS NOTE
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER: THE PRESIDENT'S
PREROGATIVE TO ESCAPE ACCOUNTABILITY
[The President] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for of-
fenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.1
[I]n democracies ... this power of pardon can never subsist, for there noth-
ing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers the laws.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution vests the President with "power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except
in cases of impeachment."'3 Although Virginia delegate Edmund Ran-
dolph raised concerns 4 about the executive branch possibly abusing the
pardon power to conceal criminal conduct at the Constitutional Conven-
tion,5 Randolph's colleagues relied upon the presumption that a president
would not break the law" and defeated his motion to limit presidential
pardon power to cases of treason.7 Recently, the scandalous Iran-Contra
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
2. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT. OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 181 (5th ed.
1984) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 397-98).
3. U.S. COHsT. art. II, § 2.
4. S. Doc. No. 34, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1690 (1989). Edmund Jennings Randolph was a
Virginia delegate at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. A former member of the Conti-
nental Congress and Governor of Virginia, Randolph subsequently was selected by George
Washington to serve as the first United States Attorney General. See JOHN J. REARDON,
EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY (1975).
5. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Ran-
dolph argued that "[t]he prerogative of pardon in these cases was too great a trust. The
President himself may be guilty. The Traytors may be his own instruments." Id. at 626.
6. James Iredell responded to Randolph's concerns stating, "[t]he probability of the Pres-
ident of the United States committing an act of treason against his country is very slight."
William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475, 503 (1977) (quoting PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 350, 351-52 (P. Ford ed., 1968)).
7. Id. at 502-03.
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affair has demonstrated that, contrary to the Framers' expectations, pres-
idents may circumvent or directly violate federal laws.
In the past, controversial uses of the executive's clemency power, such
as Gerald Ford's decision to pardon Richard Nixon," have generated pub-
lic discussion and scholarly analyses. The legitimacy and scope of the
president's power to remove individuals from the reach of the federal ju-
diciary has been intensely debated. Former President Bush's recent par-
don of six Reagan administration officials involved in the Iran-Contra af-
fair raises anew questions concerning the compatibility of presidential
clemency powers within the structure of a democracy. The scandal cen-
tered around possible presidential involvement in a scheme to violate ex-
press congressional directives by selling weapons to Iran and funneling
the proceeds of the weapon sales to Nicaraguan rebels." Although crimi-
nal proceedings were brought against executive branch officials, Bush ul-
timately pardoned the Reagan administration officials."0
The questions raised by the Iran-Contra affair provide incentive to re-
assess the nature and scope of the president's clemency powers. For per-
haps the first time in United States history, an executive pardon may
have been motivated by the self-interest of a president who halted crimi-
nal proceedings in order to suppress information concerning his own con-
duct.1" The controversy suggests that a president could utilize his or her
pardoning power to escape responsibility for illegal acts usually punished
in a democracy.
Against the backdrop of former President Bush's pardoning 2 of six for-
mer Reagan administration officials, section two of this Note examines
8. Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974). President Ford's pardon of Richard
Nixon began:
I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States, pursuant to the pardon power con-
ferred upon me by Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, have granted and by
these presents do grant a full, free and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all
offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may
have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969 through
August 9, 1974.
Id.; see also REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (finding the prospect of being the first President in American history
to be removed from office by Congress forced Nixon to resign). For an excellent analysis of
the Nixon pardon, see Duker, supra note 6, at 530-35.
9. Anthony Lewis, The Presidential Pardon: Bush's Move Menaces the Constitution, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at 6A. See infra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
11. William Schneider, Bush's Pardons Break All the Rules, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at
M2. Schneider wrote, "[t]hat's why Bush's Iran-Contra pardons are in a class by themselves.
Not only did he pardon his political allies, he pardoned them for illegal activities in which
he himself may have been implicated." Id. (emphasis added).
12. President Bush's pardons of Caspar Weinberger and five other officials have gener-
ated divergent opinions concerning the appropriateness of his actions. See Why Rush to
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the historical evolution of the president's pardoning power, from its birth
in medieval England through its development in the United States. Next,
section three examines mechanisms already present within the legislative
and judicial branches of government for maintaining a modicum of ac-
countability and control of the president's clemency powers. Section four
details the circumstances surrounding the Iran-Contra controversy and
the subsequent pardons of the government officials. Finally, section five
proposes placing specific limitations on the president's ability to grant
clemency. This Note also examines how implementation of these recom-
mendations might have influenced Bush's decision.
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CLEMENCY
When the drafters of the Constitution created the presidential power to
"grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States,' 13
they agreed that this authority would mirror the clemency powers vested
in the English Crown. 14 However, United States Supreme Court rulings
eventually expanded the federal executive clemency powers beyond those
possessed by the Crown in Great Britain. 5
A. Clemency Defined
In its broadest sense, the term "clemency" represents any manifesta-
tion of mercy.'" However, this Note will employ the term to denote mercy
or leniency in the official exercise of authority that removes all or some of
the punitive consequences of a criminal conviction. In other words, the
term "clemency" will refer to various forms of leniency extended by
Pardon Weinberger?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at A16 (criticizing the possibility of a Bush
pardon for Caspar Weinberger on the grounds that Weinberger should be brought to trial so
that information concerning the Iran-Contra scandal could be brought to light); Iran-Contra
- Bush Pardon Would Be Tantamount to Extending Pardon to Himself, Too, THE SEAT-
TLE TiMES, Nov. 15, 1992, at A19 (arguing that Bush's pardon of Weinberger would be equal
to Bush pardoning himself); Unpardonable Pardons, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 29, 1992, at
A8 (proposing that Bush would have suffered from the Iran-Contra trials); Bruce Fein,
Bush's Finest Hour: The Courageous Pardons of Iran-Contra, RECORDER, Jan. 7, 1993, at 7
(applauding Bush's pardons of Weinberger and five other former Reagan administration of-
ficials as "courageous"); Richard A. Hibey, No "Culture of Crime," WASH. POST, Jan. 9,
1993, at A19 (arguing that Bush's pardons were justified). See generally Pardon has Proved
a Divisive Force, NEWSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk Edition), Dec. 26, 1992, at 4 (noting that
exercise of the executive clemency power, because it is virtually unrestricted, is
controversial).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
14. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
16. Clemency is defined as "[k]indness, mercy, forgiveness, leniency." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 252 (6th ed. 1990).
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branches of the government, most often the executive, to remit the pun-
ishment of those who have violated state or federal laws.
Clemency embraces five distinct forms of leniency commonly recog-
nized in the American legal system: pardon, amnesty, reprieve, commuta-
tion, and remission of fines."i A pardon can take several forms.1 ' An abso-
lute pardon forgives the offense without any condition while a conditional
pardon may limit forgiveness in time or upon the performance or nonper-
formance of acts specified by the executive. 19 A full pardon absolves the
offender of most legal consequences, ° whereas a partial pardon relieves
the offender of only a portion of the legal ramifications of conviction. Par-
dons may be extended either before or after conviction and commonly are
used to restore the civil rights and reputation of an individual who has
completed his or her designated punishment and demonstrated
rehabilitation.2 1
Amnesty typically is extended to individuals who are subject to trial
but have not yet been convicted.22 Although amnesty has largely the same
legal effect as a pardon,23 it does not eliminate from a person's record the
offense for which punishment is being remitted. 24 A reprieve,2 5 on the
other hand, the most limited form of clemency, is the temporary post-
17. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from
the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569, 575 (1991).
18. Charles S. Clark, Reagan Parsimonious in Use of Pardon Power, CONG. Q., Nov. 3,
1984, at 2878. Chief Justice Marshall supplied the classic definition of a pardon when he
stated, "[a] pardon is an act of grace, [of the Executive] . . . which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has commit-
ted." United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). In Marshall's definition, the
term "pardon" is used in its generic sense; it includes all forms of clemency. Stanley Grupp,
Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon in England, 7 THE AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 51 (1963)
(quoting Christen Jensen, Pardon, 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA Soc. SCI. 570 (1933)).
19. See Patrick R. Cowlishaw, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. L. REV. 149
(1975) (examining the potential for abuse rooted within the president's authority to attach
conditions to pardons).
20. A pardon does not erase the commission of an offense for purposes of employment
qualifications based on character. See Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915).
21. Kobil, supra note 17, at 576.
22. Reed Cozart, Clemency Under the Federal System, 23 FED. PROBATION 3 (1959).
23. Cowlishaw, supra note 19, at 150. The practical effect of amnesty is virtually identical
to that of a pardon, and American law recognizes little distinction between the two.
24. Kobil, supra note 17, at 577. In Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1877),
the Court explained:
It is sometimes said that [amnesty] operates as an extinction of the offence of which
it is the object, causing it to be forgotten, so far as the public interests are concerned,
whilst [pardon] only operates to remove the penalties of the offense. This distinction,
is not, however, recognized in our law.
Id. at 152.
25. The term "reprieve" is derived from the French word "reprendre," which means "take
back." Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 43 (1916).
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ponement of the execution of a sentence.26 Unlike other forms of clem-
ency, a reprieve does not defeat the eventual imposition of judgment. It
merely withdraws the sentence for a specified time period.
2 7
Commutation also is within the president's clemency powers. Commu-
tation is the substitution of a lesser sentence for the original punishment
imposed by a court.2 8 Unlike a pardon, it does not disturb the legal conse-
quences that may attach to a conviction.2 9 Finally, the authority to remit
fines and forfeitures which accrue from offenses against the United States
is also within the broad ambit of the president's clemency powers.3 0 The
president's power to remit fines and forfeitures, however, is limited to
monetary penalties which have not yet been paid to the United States.'
B. The Development of the Clemency Power
At common law, the King possessed broad powers to pardon offenses
either before or after indictment, conviction, and sentencing.32 The King
could grant conditional or unconditional pardons based on the perform-
ance of a precedent or subsequent action.3 3 In essence, these powers were
designed to grant mercy where it was deserved.3
4
1. Clemency Power: An Absolute Royal Prerogative
Although clemency power ultimately became an exclusively royal pre-
rogative, the Crown originally had many competitors vying for this
26. Id. at 43-44.
27. See KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5
(1989). A reprieve usually is extended to afford an offender the opportunity to complete
pending appeals. However, it also has been used to -allow an unhealthy capital offender time
to recover before being executed and to permit a pregnant mother to give birth to her child.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 394. Blackstone maintained that extending a re-
prieve to a pregnant mother was "dictated by the law of nature." Id. at 395.
28. Clark, supra note 18, at 2878. The authority to commute sentences is a part of the
general grant of pardoning power. Thus, if the entire offense may be pardoned, then a part
of the punishment may be remitted or the sentence commuted. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S.
480, 486-87 (1926); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855).
29. Kobil, supra note 17, at 577. For example, commutation does not restore civil rights,
such as the privilege to vote or the competency to testify in court. See id.
30. The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 413 (1885). The Court held that "the power of the President
to grant pardons includes the power to remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed for the
commission of offenses against, or for the violation of the laws of, the United States." Id.
31. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877). In this case, the Court held that the
president "cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United States, except expressly au-
thorized by act of Congress." Id.
32. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 480 (1968).
33. Id. at 476.
34. See GEORGE 13. ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 78-79 (1921).
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power.35 However, by the time of Henry the Eighth in 1535, the power to
extend clemency became the sole right of the Crown.36 Clemency power
was vested exclusively in the Crown because "nothing higher is acknowl-
edged than the magistrate, who administers the laws; and it would be
impolitic for the power of judging and pardoning to centre in one and the
same person. 3 s7 According to one commentator, "[a] Pardon is a work of
mercy, whereby the King either before attainder, sentence, or conviction,
or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution, right, title,
debt or duty, Temporall or Ecclesiasticall ... ""
2. A Constitutional Crisis: The Impeachment of Osborne
The absolute vesting of clemency power in the Crown remained essen-
tially unchanged until 1678. It was then that a controversy arose over
whether Charles the Second could employ his power to grant clemency to
frustrate Parliament's impeachment of Thomas Osborne, the Lord High
Treasurer of England.3 9 Osborne, in his official capacity as Lord High
Treasurer of England, secretly had followed the King's directive to extend
an offer of neutrality to France in exchange for a substantial monetary
payment.40 Since Osborne was carrying out the King's express orders, he
was beyond the reach of Parliament in its struggle to control the conduct
of foreign policy.41 Consequently, Osborne was singled out by Parliament
35. Grupp, supra note 18, at 55. Grupp notes that "the Church, the great earls, and the
feudal courts" were among the contenders for the Crown's pardon prerogative. Id.
36 Comment, Constitutional Law - Presidential Pardons and the Common Law, 53
N.C. L. REV. 785, 788 (1975). In 1535, the British Parliament enacted a statute which
granted the King exclusive authority to grant a pardon:
That no person or persons, of what estate or degree soever they be ... shall have any
power or authority to pardon or remit any treasons, murders, manslaughters or any
felonies whatsoever they be. .. but that the king's highness, his heirs and successors,
kings of this realm, shall have the whole and sole power and authority thereof united
and knit to the Imperial Crown of this realm, as of good right and equity it ap-
pertaineth; any grants, usages, prescriptions, act or acts of parliament, or any other
thing to the contrary notwithstanding.
Grupp, supra note 18, at 55 (quoting An Act for Recontinuing Liberties in the Crown, 1535,
27 Hen. 8, ch. 24 (Eng.)).
37. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2. At common law, the King possessed great latitude and
flexibility in exercising his pardoning power which ensured an unrestricted ability to bestow
mercy. ADAMS, supra note 34, at 78-79.
38. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 233
(1817).
39. For an excellent narrative of Osborne's impeachment see Duker, supra note 6, at 487-
95.
40. Id. at 488. This offer was made only five days after Parliament had passed an act to
raise and appropriate funds for conducting a war with France. Id.
41. JOSEPH CHirrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN AND THE
RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 5 (1820) (noting that "the law supposes it
impossible that the King himself can act unlawfully or improperly. It cannot disturb him
whom it has invested with supreme power."). Id.
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for impeachment, which included not only removal from office, but also
more severe types of punishment.
42
A crisis over the scope of the Crown's clemency power occurred when
Charles the Second frustrated Parliament by pardoning Osborne prior to
the conclusion of the impeachment process.4" An outraged Parliament
questioned the legality of the pardon and considered measures to limit
the scope of the royal pardoning prerogative.4 4 A political compromise fi-
nally was reached. Osborne's impeachment was aborted, but he was im-
prisoned for five years in the Tower of London.45
3. The Aftermath of the Osborne Impeachment: Parliament Imposes
Limitations Upon the King's Clemency Powers
Following the Osborne inipeachment, Parliament restricted the King's
authority to extend clemency by enacting three measures: the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679,46 the 1689 Bill of Rights,47 and the 1700 Act of Set-
tlement.48 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 prohibited royal clemency in
cases in which persons were convicted of causing others to be imprisoned
outside the realm, and, as a result, beyond the reach of English habeas
corpus protection. 4 The 1689 Bill of Rights indirectly weakened the
King's clemency power by depriving him of the power to suspend the op-
42. Duker, supra note 6, at 488. The Parliament moved to impeach Osborne on counts of
treason and other high crimes and misdemeanors. For the Articles of Impeachment
presented against Osborne, see 4 WILLIAM COBBETrr, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND
1067-69 (1966).
43. The circumstances surrounding the Osborne impeachment and pardon are analogous
to President Bush's pardons of Weinberger and five other Reagan administration officials.
In both scenarios, a subordinate executive official acted secretly in compliance with execu-
tive desires to achieve certain foreign policy objectives. In so doing, the subordinate circum-
vented legislative measures promulgated expressly to prevent such action. When the clan-
destine activity surfaced, the executive pardoned the subordinate much to the legislative
body's frustration. See Kobil, supra note 17, at 587 (comparing the Osborne pardon and the
Iran-Contra scandal before the Bush pardons).
44. Duker, supra note 6, at 491-94. Prior to the impeachment of Osborne, the King's
prerogative of mercy had always been considered absolute. ADAMS, supra note 34, at 78.
45. Duker, supra note 6, at 495.
46. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, § 11 (Eng.).
47. Bill of Rights, 1689, W. & M., ch. 2, § 2 (Eng.).
48. Act of Settlement, 1700, etc.; see also 13 H.C. JOUR. 625 (1700); 16 H.L. JOUR. 738
(1700).
49. 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, § 11 ((Eng.) 1679). Section 11 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
prohibited arbitrary imprisonment and made it an offense against the King and his govern-
ment (a praemunire) "to send any subject or prisoner beyond the seas." Id. In other words,
the "Act made it an offense. . . for any person causing the King's subjects to be imprisoned
beyond the English realm, -and prohibited clemency in such cases." Duker, supra note 6, at
495. Duker characterizes this Act as a minor but effective limitation on the King's clemency
powers. Id.
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eration of a given law or to disregard its execution. 50 In the 1700 Act of
Settlement, Parliament successfully prohibited the King's use of pardon-
ing powers in impeachment cases, although it did not prohibit the mon-
arch from pardoning an individual after the impeachment allegations had
been heard and decided. 51 Finally, a legislative act passed in 1721 gave
Parliament power concurrent with that of the Crown to grant pardons.2
The drafters of the United States Constitution convened after Parlia-
ment had imposed these restrictions upon the royal pardoning preroga-
tive. Within this context of clemency practices, the Framers included
presidential pardoning power in the Constitution.
C. Clemency Power in the United States: Moving Beyond the Common
Law
Although incorporated into the United States Constitution as it existed
in English common law,5" presidential pardoning powers ultimately ex-
panded beyond the royal prerogative. Indeed, early United States Su-
preme Court decisions gave great deference to the presidential pardoning
powers, leaving this authority virtually unrestricted.
1. The Constitutional Convention
The relative paucity of debate at the federal Constitutional Convention
concerning inclusion of the pardoning power in the Constitution5 4 sug-
50. Bill of Rights, 1689, W. & M., ch. 2, § 2. The enactment states:
1. That the pretended power of suspending the laws, or the execution of laws, by
regal authority, without consent of Parliament, is illegal.
2. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by
regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal.
1 W. & M. ch. 36 (Eng. 1688). See also Kobil, supra note 17, at 587-88.
51. Grupp, supra note 18, at 57; 4 HENRY J. STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 465 (photo. reprint 1979) (1845).
52. See Grupp, supra note 18, at 57.
53. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974). Chief Justice Burger wrote that "[t]he his-
tory of our executive pardoning power reveals a consistent pattern of adherence to the Eng-
lish common-law practice." Id.
54. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626-27 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]; see also John D. Feerick, The Pardoning Power of Article
I of the Constitution, N.Y. ST. B. J. 7, 9 (Jan. 1975). The few reported exchanges at the
Convention concerning the president's pardoning powers proposed limitations. One propo-
sal, which was soundly defeated, was to restrict presidential power by allowing the executive
to grant reprieves only until the ensuing session of the Senate. Pardons then would be ex-
tended only with the consent of the Senate. RECORDS, supra, at 419-20. Another motion,
proposed by Luther Martin, sought to limit the exercise of the clemency power to the period
"after conviction." Martin subsequently withdrew the proposal when another delegate,
James Wilson, argued that pardoning should be permissible before conviction since the de-
fendant's testimony might be necessary to obtain the conviction of accomplices. Id. at 426.
A third motion, made by Edmund Randolph, suggested that the president's power to grant
[Vol. 27:345
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gests that the delegates intended presidential clemency powers to mirror
those of the English Crown.55 Although the delegates recognized the po-
tential breadth of the clemency power, all of the proposed limitations on
the exercise of that power were ultimately defeated at the Convention.5"
Thus, the executive's clemency power, a privilege uncharacteristic of the
constitutional framework of checks and balances and limited democracy,
was incorporated into the Constitution.
2. Post-Convention Discussion
Shortly after the federal Constitutional Convention, critics of the pro-
posed Constitution objected that the president's unrestrained power to
grant clemency might be subject to abuse, particularly in cases of trea-
son.57 In response to this criticism, Alexander Hamilton justified the exec-
utive's right to pardon on grounds that "one man appears to be a more
eligible dispenser of the mercy of the government than a body of men."58
Moreover, Hamilton persuasively argued that:
[h]umanity and good policy conspire to dictate that the benign prerogative
of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The
criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that
without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice
would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel .... 9
In this fashion, executive clemency power was adopted into the Consti-
tution unchanged from the English common law pardoning privilege.
With the concurrence of state ratifying conventions, the presidential
power to pardon was incorporated into the Constitution with little discus-
sion or debate.60
clemency be withdrawn in cases of treason. Although a number of delegates agreed that the
power to pardon treason should not rest exclusively in the president, Randolph was unwill-
ing to agree that the president should share this power with the Senate. As a result, Ran-
dolph's motion failed. Id. at 626. See also supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
55. RECORDS, supra note 54, at 419-20. The Report of the Committee of Detail retained
the president as the sole guardian of clemency power. The Report's language resembled the
1700 English Act of Settlement in providing that the presidential pardon "shall not be
pleadable in Bar of an Impeachment." Id. at 172. Subsequently, this language was modified
to its present form --"except in cases of impeachment" - without reported debate. Id. at
173.
56. See supra note 54.
57. RECORDS, supra note 54, at 639.
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
59. Id. at 500-01. An extensive discussion of the president's clemency powers appears in
THE FEDERALIST No. 74.
60. See Duker, supra note 6, at 504; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 236 (4th ed. 1991).
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3. The Supreme Court: Expanding the Scope of the President's Clem-
ency Powers Beyond the Common Law
The power of the president to grant "[r]eprieves and [p]ardons for
[o]ffenses against the United States, except in [c]ases of
[i]mpeachment"6 1 can be traced directly to the executive clemency pow-
ers exercised by the English Crown.62 In United States v. Wilson,6 3 the
first Supreme Court decision to consider the scope of the president's par-
doning power, Chief Justice Marshall expressly recognized the similarities
between the English and American forms of clemency and emphasized
the need for American courts to look to English common law for guid-
ance. He wrote:
As this power has been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of
that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institu-
tions ours bear a close resemblance, we adopt the principles respecting the
operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules
prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would
avail himself of it.6 4
Since Wilson the Supreme Court has relied primarily upon English
common law in determining the extent of the presidential clemency
power. 5 Nevertheless, the Court has interpreted the executive's powers
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
62. Christopher C. Joyner, Rethinking the President's Power of Executive Pardon, 43
FED. PROBATION 16 (1979). See also supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text concerning
the adoption of clemency powers into the Constitution.
63. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
64. Id. at 160. Although American courts rely upon English common law for guidance
regarding the presidential pardoning powers, the wisdom of this practice has been ques-
tioned. See Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 318 (1855) (McLean, J., dissenting). In
Ex parte Wells, Justice McLean objected to the use of English precedent, stating:
[tihe executive office in England and that of this country is so widely different, that
doubts may be entertained whether it would be safe for a republican chief magistrate,
who is the creature of the laws, to be influenced by the exercise of any leading power
of the British sovereign.
Id.
65. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260-
66 (1974); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 99-121 (1925); Burdick v. United States, 236
U.S. 79, 82 (1915); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 151 (1877); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 307, 310-13 (1855).
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expansively,"6 resulting in an American presidential pardoning power
much broader than that of the English Crown.6 7
In addition to recognizing the executive's broad discretion to pardon,
the Supreme Court also defined the nature of a pardon expansively. In
Wilson, the Court defined a pardon as "an act of grace proceeding from
the power entrusted with the execution of laws. .. "68 Under Marshall's
"act of grace" characterization, acceptance of the pardon by the offender
was required for the pardon to be valid.6 9 As a result, most lower courts
viewed the executive's grant of a pardon as a merciful act bestowing grace
upon an individual.7
0
However, the Court abandoned its traditional approach in Biddle v.
Perovich.7 1 In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Court stated
that a pardon was an act for the public welfare, "not a private act of
grace from an individual happening to possess power. '72 Therefore, a
66. See Schick, 419 U.S. at 256 (holding that the President is not limited to replacing a
commuted sentence with another legislatively authorized sentence for the crime); Biddle v.
Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927) (deciding that clemency power extends to commutations of
sentences regardless of whether the recipient accepted the commutation); Ex parte Gross-
man, 267 U.S. at 87 (ruling that the President has the power to pardon the offense of crimi-
nal contempt of court); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92 (1890) (holding that the
President can remit fines and forfeitures); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,
142 (1872) (determining that the President can grant conditional amnesty to specified clas-
ses or groups); Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (stating that the
federal executive clemency powers include the ability to commute sentences); Ex parte Gar-
land, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333, 380 (1866) (deciding that "[tihe [clemency] power ... is unlim-
ited"); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 313-14 (holding that the President could condi-
tion the grant of pardons on the recipient's acquiescence to virtually any terms).
67. 59 A. JUR. 2D Pardon and Parole § 13 (1987); see also Kobil, supra note 17, at 596.
68. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). Chief Justice Marshall pro-
vided the classic definition of a pardon when he wrote, "[a] pardon is an act of grace...
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts
for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official, act of the executive magis-
trate ... ." Id.
69. In Wilson, Marshall emphasized the necessity of the defendant's acceptance of the
pardon by stating:
A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not
complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is
tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on
him.
Id. at 161.
70. Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160-61. In Wilson, Chief Justice Marshall characterized a pardon
as "the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court." Id; see also
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (stating that the president exercises a
"benign power of mercy"); Ex Parte Wells 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 324 (1855) (characterizing
the president's commutation of a sentence as an "act of mercy").
71. 274 U.S. 480 (1915).
72. Id. at 486. Justice Holmes stated:
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valid pardon no longer required acceptance by the offender.7 3 The Court
based its opinion on logic instead of looking to common law principles. 74
The importance of the Biddle Court's characterization of a pardon as
an act for the public welfare and its repudiation of the pardon as an act
of mercy is evident in light of Burdick v. United States,7 5 a case decided
in 1915, twelve years before Biddle. In Burdick, the Court held that ac-
ceptance of a pardon was necessary and that a witness in a grand jury
proceeding could reject an offer of clemency and assert his privilege
against self-incrimination.7" The Court recognized that the stigma of a
pardon might be more burdensome than the consequences of a convic-
tion.77 Therefore, a full pardon could not be forced upon a journalist
whom the government wanted to have testify before a federal grand
jury.78
Twelve years later in Biddle, however, the Court determined that a
pardon is an act for the public welfare, not an act of mercy. 9 Therefore,
the Court ruled that presidential commutation of a death sentence to life
imprisonment was valid without an inmate's consent.80 In the interest of
the "public welfare," the president could impose clemency regardless of
whether the offender chose to accept the pardon.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further defined the nature and
effect of the president's pardoning powers. For example, in Ex parte Gar-
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to
possess power. It is part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the deter-
mination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by
inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.
Id.
73. Although Biddle does not explicitly answer the question whether acceptance is neces-
sary for an unconditional pardon to be valid, one commentator noted:
Whether these words sound the death knell of the acceptance doctrine is perhaps
doubtful. They seem clearly to indicate that by substantiating a commutation order
for a deed of pardon, a president can always have his way' in such matters, provided
the substituted penalty is authorized by law and does not in common understanding
exceed the original penalty.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S.
Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 457 (1964).
74. For example, concerning the validity of a pardon, Justice Holmes wrote, "[tlhe only
question is whether the substituted punishment was authorized by law - here, whether the
change is within the scope of the words of the Constitution, Article II, section 2." Biddle,
274 U.S. at 487.
75. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
76. Id. at 94.
77. Id. at 90-91.
78. Id. at 93-94.
79. Biddle, 274 U.S. at 486.
80. Id. at 487. Justice Holmes wrote that the prisoner "on no sound principle ought to
have any voice in what the law should do for the welfare of the whole." Id.
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land"" the Court recognized that coordinate branches of government can-
not limit the executive's clemency power. The Court ruled:
[t]he [clemency] power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception [of'
impeachment cases] .... It extends to every offence known to the law,
and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal
proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and
judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control.
Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its
exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed
cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.8 2
In sum, early Supreme Court cases construed the president's clemency
powers more broadly than those possessed by the English Crown. In spite
of the Court's propensity to expansively interpret this power, the Court
also imposed certain narrow restrictions upon the presidential pardoning
powers.
4. Limitations Imposed Upon the President's Pardoning Powers
Despite the Court's expansive interpretation of the presidential par-
doning power, certain narrow limitations on this power also have been
judicially recognized. In Knote v. United States,8 3 the Court noted that a
pardon cannot compensate for personal injuries suffered by imprison-
ment, nor can a pardon affect any rights vested in third parties resulting
from a judgment against the offender.84 Similarly, the Knote Court held
that the presidential pardoning power "cannot touch moneys in the Trea-
sury of the United States, except [as] expressly authorized by act of Con-
gress."8' 5 Otherwise, the appropriations power of Congress outlined in Ar-
ticle I of the Constitution would be violated."'
Although limited in a subsequent decision, 87 in Burdick v. United
Statess the Court ruled that the city editor of a newspaper could refuse
acceptance of a presidential pardon which was extended to induce him
into answering federal grand jury questions.8 9 In so holding, the Court
observed that the clemency power and the offender's Fifth Amendment
rights "[b]oth have sanction in the Constitution, and it should, therefore,
81. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
82. Id. at 380.
83. 95 U.S. 149 (1877).
84. Id. at 153-55.
85. Id. at 154.
86. Id. at 154-55.
87. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 488 (1927) (holding that the reasoning of Burdick "is
not to be extended to the present case").
88. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
89. Id. at 93-95. The Burdick Court indicated in dictum that "[a pardon] ... carries an
imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it." Id. at 94.
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be the anxiety of the law to preserve both, - to leave to each its proper
place."90
In Schick v. Reed,91 the majority opinion emphasized that only the lim-
its found in the Constitution itself can be imposed upon the presidential
pardoning power.92 To require the president to substitute a punishment
already permitted by law would place unauthorized congressional restric-
tions on the pardoning power. 3 The Schick Court also recognized that
the president is free to attach any condition on the pardon "which does
not otherwise offend the Constitution.
94
In Hoffa v. Saxbe,95 the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia upheld the validity of a commutation extended by President
Richard M. Nixon to labor union leader Jimmy Hoffa on the condition
"that the said James R. Hoffa not engage in direct or indirect manage-
ment of any labor organization prior to March 6, 1980 . . . ."" Although
the court emphasized the executive's need for flexibility in the exercise of
his pardoning powers,97 the court did limit the president's authority to
attach conditions. The opinion explained that the "framework of our con-
stitutional system" establishes "limits beyond which the President may
not go in imposing and subsequently enforcing . ..conditions" on par-
dons.9 Thus, any condition attached to a pardon must "directly relate to
the public interest" and "not unreasonably infringe on the [offender's]
constitutional freedoms."99
Decisions such as Knote, Burdick, Schick, and Hoffa illustrate that the
federal judiciary did impose some limitations upon the exercise of presi-
dential clemency powers. Despite the specific limitations found in each of
these decisions, however, the overall impact of the Court's holdings ex-
panded the presidential pardoning powers beyond those granted by the
common law. Consequently, the president enjoys a power so broad and
unchecked that it surpasses even that of a sovereign.
90. Id. at 93-94.
91. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
92. Id. at 267.
93. Id. at 266-67.
94. Id. at 266.
95. 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974).
96. Id. at 1224 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 1226. The court held that the King's authority to grant clemency had been
sufficiently broad to encompass conditions not previously authorized by Parliament. Id. at
1229.
98. Id. at 1234-35.
99. Id. at 1236. The court found that conditions of clemency could not be "unlawful, un-
reasonable, immoral, or impossible of performance." Id. at 1236-37 (footnote omitted).
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III. CHECKS ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY POWER
Although the president's pardoning powers are virtually unrestricted,
the legislature and judiciary can sufficiently influence this executive pre-
rogative to ensure the accountability of the president.100 In addition to
possessing concurrent powers of clemency, Congress also could amend the
Constitution to restrict the president's authority to extend pardons. Fur-
thermore, the judiciary may strike down pardons which contain unconsti-
tutional conditions. Acting in concert, these two branches of government
can help ensure the accountability of the president when he extends
clemency to government officials. 101
A. Legislative.Branch
Supreme Court decisions suggest that the president's pardoning power
is not subject to congressional restrictions.102 In Ex Parte Garland,10 3 the
Court held that the "[pardon] power of the President is not subject to
legislative control."'14 Years later, in Schick v. Reed,105 the Court referred
to the pardon power as "flow[ing] from the Constitution alone, not from
any legislative enactments," and observed that the power "cannot be
modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress."'0 6
100. It is not suggested that the legislative and judicial branches can effectively override
the president's pardoning powers in our current system of government. As Duker notes, the
president's pardoning power "cannot be checked by the other branches of government."
Duker, supra note 6, at 475. However, the legislative and judicial branches can affect the
exercise of federal clemency powers to a degree.
101. As was illustrated by the events following President Bush's pardons in the Iran-Con-
tra scandal, perhaps the sole fashion in which the other branches of government realistically
can help ensure accountability from the executive is by expressing their reactions to the
pardons in the media. Although congressional leaders expressed outrage and disappoint-
ment in response to the pardons, this did little to deter Bush, who as a lame duck president
was unaccountable to the electorate. See supra note 12.
102. See Duker, supra note 6, at 513-18. After the Civil War, Congress attempted to re-
strict the president's clemency power. In 1867, Congress passed a measure which prevented
the president from restoring confiscated property to people who had participated in the
rebellion. Id. at 513-15. Two years later, the Senate Judiciary Committee passed a bill de-
claring President Andrew Johnson's "Christmas Proclamation of 1868" which pardoned "all
persons guilty of treason and acts of hostility," unconstitutional. Id. at 517 (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1281 (1869)).
103. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
104. Id. at 380. In Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), Chief Justice Taft, writing
about the nature of the executive pardoning power, maintained that "whoever is to make
[the pardoning power] useful must have full discretion to exercise it. Our Constitution con-
fers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse
it." Id. at 121. The "full discretion" to which Taft refers implies that the president's par-
doning power is not subject to control by any other entity, even Congress.
105. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
106. Id. at 266. Along similar lines, in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871), the
Court underscored the president's prerogative in the exercise of the pardon power:
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Although Congress may not restrict the president's use of the pardon-
ing power, this prerogative is vested concurrently in the Congress. 10
Thus, Congress could utilize its clemency powers to supplement existing
executive clemency practices and to grant pardons to deserving appli-
cants 08 if the president declined to exercise his clemency powers.109
In addition to enjoying concurrent clemency powers with the president,
Congress may initiate the constitutional amendment process to restrict
the president's authority to pardon executive branch personnel.1 0 How-
ever, the amendment process is slow, arduous and easily thwarted by po-
litical interests within a minority of states.' As a result of difficulties
imposed by the Constitution and because pardoning controversies arise
infrequently, it is doubtful that a constitutional amendment limiting the
executive clemency powers could generate sufficient political momentum
to succeed.
[i]t is the intention of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate depart-
ments of government - the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary - shall be,
in its sphere, independent of the others. To the executive alone is intrusted the
power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
107. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896). In Brown, the Court observed that, al-
though the Constitution vests the president with pardoning power, "this power has never
been held to take from Congress the power to pass acts of general amnesty." Id. See gener-
ally The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885) (holding that the Secretary of the Treasury has the
power to remit penalties); Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) (holding that the
judiciary has the power to pardon a sentence).
108. See Kobil, supra note 17, at 615 (noting that "[p]ossible problems could result from
such a system, including questions as to what should happen when the two clemency proce-
dures reach conflicting results in the same case"). Id. at 615 n.212.
109. Commentators have noted that President Reagan's refusal to extend pardons to Oli-
ver North and John Poindexter may have resulted from the realization that granting clem-
ency would appear to be an attempt to hide the coverup of the scandal. Thus, in similar
situations, Congress has the option of extending clemency. See, e.g., Garry Wills, Bush
Granting Pardons is Simply Unpardonable, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 28, 1992, at A13.
110. Subsequent to the pardoning of President Richard M. Nixon, Senator Walter
Mondale of Minnesota proposed a constitutional amendment to allow congressional veto of
presidential pardons by a two-thirds vote of each House. The proposed amendment pro-
vided that, "[n]o pardon granted an individual by the President under section 2 of Article II
shall be effective if Congress by resolution, two-thirds of the members of each House con-
curring therein, disapproves the granting of the pardon within 180 days of its issuance."
However, this proposal never received full consideration. Duker, supra note 6, at 537 (quot-
ing S.J. REs. 240, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)). Duker applauded this proposal as "the opti-
mum solution." Id.
111. One commentator observed:
[The Framers] contrived an elaborate and difficult process for amending the Consti-
tution, requiring a proposal by two-thirds of both the Senate and the House, and
ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures. (Such strictures operate with
anti-majoritarian effect to this day. Thus, although national polls show a substantial
majority of Americans support the Equal Rights Amendment, the proposal failed to
make its way through the constitutional labyrinth.)
MICHAEL PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW 61 (5th ed. 1988).
[Vol. 27:345360
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER
B. Judicial Branch
Although the judiciary possesses the ability to restrict the president's
pardoning power through its authority to interpret the Constitution,11 2
historically, the federal courts have been reluctant to limit executive
clemency powers. 113 This deferential approach is due to the tension be-
tween the premise that the executive's authority to grant clemency
should be unfettered" and the judiciary's responsibility to review the
constitutionality of executive actions." 5
The monumental decision of Ex parte Grossman"6 effectively enabled
the president to shield subordinate executive branch personnel from both
judicial inquiry and congressional investigation."' On behalf of the trial
court, special assistants to the Attorney General argued that if the presi-
dent were allowed to pardon offenders for contempt of court, the very
existence of the judiciary would be undermined and the president himself
would be the source of judicial authority."' This argument was rejected
by the Court which held that the power to pardon for contempt of court
is inherent in the executive pardoning power.1 9 As a result, the president
now clearly possesses authority to frustrate the power of a court to pro-
tect itself, a power "essential to the operation of the judiciary.' ' 20 The
Grossman Court's expansive interpretation of the executive clemency
powers not only empowered the president to invade the provinces of coor-
dinate branches of government, but also prevented the judiciary from reg-
ulating these powers.
Although Grossman and other Supreme Court decisions grant the pres-
ident broad clemency powers, the Court also has recognized specific limi-
tations on the president's use of the pardoning powers.' 2' The province of
112. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969) (reaffirming the responsibility of the
Court to determine whether the action of a coordinate branch of government exceeds the
authority vested in that branch by the Constitution).
113. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
114. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 263 n.6 (1974). The draftsmen of the Constitution
stated that the pardoning power should not be "fettered or embarrassed." Id. (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
115. Kobil, supra note 17, at 597. Kobil states, "[a] more difficult issue. . . concerns the
authority of the judiciary to limit the president's clemency power, an issue which pits the
notion that the presidential clemency power should be unfettered against the principle that
the judiciary is responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of executive actions." Id.
116. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
117. See Duker, supra note 6, at 526-30. In his historical analysis of the federal pardoning
power, Duker notes the Grossman decision permits the president to pardon contempts of
court as well as contempts of Congress. Id. at 528-29.
118. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 98.
119. Id. at 121.
120. Duker, supra note 6, at 528.
121. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
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the judiciary is to determine the law. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
courts to review the president's exercise of clemency power in order to
ensure that it is in compliance with the Constitution. For example, in
light of the Court's holdings that the judiciary can refuse to give effect to
a presidential pardon that attaches an unconstitutional condition122 or
that affects the vested rights of third parties,'12 3 the Court could invali-
date pardons that expressly violate the Constitution or conflict with pub-
lic policy.
IV. PRESIDENT BUSH'S USE OF THE PARDONING POWER: AN ACT OF
MERCY OR AN UNPARDONABLE PARDON OF HIMSELF?
President Bush's controversial decision to pardon Caspar Weinberger
and five other former Reagan Administration officials has polarized both
legal and political communities. 124 Defenders of President Bush applaud
the President's courage and fortitude in deciding to extend the pardons.
Bush and his supporters believe that Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh
was overreaching in indicting the ailing seventy-five-year-old Weinberger.
However, Walsh has argued that the pardons do nothing more than com-
plete the Iran-Contra cover up. Moreover, Walsh has asserted that the
pardons were extended by Bush to conceal his own misconduct in the
Iran-Contra scandal. 1
25
A. The Iran-Contra Affair
The Iran-Contra scandal erupted with the November 1986 disclosure' 6
that the Reagan administration, in violation of the President's stated pol-
icies,' 1 7 secretly sold arms to Iran via Israel" s in hopes of gaining the
122. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974); see also Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S.
79 (1915) (holding that clemency could not be extended to deprive a witness of his Fifth
Amendment rights).
123. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877).
124. See supra note 12.
125. A mere fifteen percent of those polled in a CNN-USA TODAY Gallup poll thought
Bush pardoned Weinberger and the others to "protect people he felt acted honorably and
patriotically from unfair prosecution." Fifty percent of the public thought Bush's real mo-
tive was "to protect himself from legal difficulties or embarrassment resulting from his own
role in Iran-Contra." William Schneider, Bush's Pardons Break All the Rules, L.A. TIMEs,
Jan. 3, 1993, at M2.
126. REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR,
H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987). [hereinafter COMMITTEE
REPORT]. On November 3, 1986, a Beirut weekly, Al-Shiraa, reported that the United States
secretly had sold weapons to Iran. William C. Banks, While Congress Slept: The Iran-Con-
tra Affair and Institutional Responsibility for Covert Operations, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 291, 291 (1988).
127. See N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1985, at A10 (quoting President Reagan's statement on June
30, 1985, "[tlhe United States gives terrorists no rewards and no guarantees. We make no
concessions. We make no deals." Id.).
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freedom of United States hostages held captive in Lebanon. 129 The Rea-
gan administration procured these arms sales in violation of the Boland
Amendments,'" which were promulgated by Congress with the express
purpose of halting the President's support to the Contras in Nicaragua.' 3 '
The sales were accomplished by soliciting foreign countries and private
donors to aid in the transfer of arms to Iran."' These covert funding op-
erations continued until November 1986, when the Iran-Contra scandal
surfaced.
Shortly after the scandal became public, the President and Attorney
General initiated separate investigations into the allegations. The Presi-
dent appointed the Tower Commission' 33 and the Attorney General ap-
128. Cf. Tom Morganthau & Robert Parry, Hot on the Iran Money Trail, NEWSWEEK,
May 4, 1987, at 24 (stating that various businessmen and officials profited as middlemen
between the United States and Iran in the arms sales).
129. See Brian Duffy & Melissa Healy, A Troubling Midsummer Mystery, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 10, 1987, at 14 (explaining that weapons sales profits were diverted to the
Contras); Russell Watson & John Barry, A Stunning Indictment, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1987,
at 26 (explaining that the Iran initiative evolved into an arms for hostages deal).
130. See The Five Amendments, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1987, at 30. In 1982, Congress en-
acted legislation known as the Boland Amendments, which were designed to control the
level of funding available to the Contras fighting in Nicaragua. Id. The third and fourth
amendments, which were in effect during the period in question, banned all funds available
to specified government agencies and all other intelligence entities from being used either
directly or indirectly, to support the Contras. Id. (Boland Amendment 3 was in effect from
Oct. 3, 1984 to Sept. 30, 1985. Boland Amendment 4 was in effect from Aug. 8, 1985 to
March 31, 1986). See generally Who Knew What, TIME, July 20, 1987, at 24 (stating that
the diversion and solicitation of funds may have been a violation of Boland Amendment as
well as a conspiracy to defraud government). Boland Amendment 3 provided in pertinent
part that during fiscal year 1985 no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intel-
ligence activities "may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which would have the
effect of supporting directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua
by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual." Intelligence Authorization
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-618, § 801, 98 Stat. 3298, 3304 (1984).
131. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 126, at 31.
132. See It Ain't Over Till It's Over, TIME, July 27, 1987, at 19 (reporting that Oliver
North, the central figure in the Iran weapons sales, spent nearly three years coordinating the
operation of arms purchases and Contra funding); George I. Church, Ollie's Turn, TIME,
July 13, 1987, at 22-23 (noting that North worked closely with former National Security
Advisor Robert McFarlane and CIA Director William Casey). See generally Who Knew
What, TIME, July 20, 1987, at 24 (reporting that raising private and foreign funds for the
Contras and using Iran weapons sales profits to support the Contras were activities included
in the covert operations).
133. On November 26, 1986, President Reagan named former Texas Senator John G.
Tower, former National Security Advisor Brent Skowcroft, and former Secretary of State
Edmund S. Muskie as the special panel to investigate the National Security Council. COUN-
CIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC., AMERICA AND THE WORLD 653 (1986) [hereinafter AMERICA
AND THE WORLD]. The results of the Tower Commission's investigation are contained in
JOHN TOWER, EDMOND MUSKIE, & BRENT SKOWCROFT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL
REVIEW BOARD (Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter TOWER REPORT]. The Tower Report may have
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pointed a special prosecutor to investigate possible criminal conduct by
high-ranking members of the Reagan administration.1 3 4 The special pros-
ecutor, Iran-Contra independent counsel Lawrence Walsh," 5 brought
fourteen indictments and obtained eleven convictions 3 6 during a thirty-
five million dollar six-year investigation into the involvement of the CIA
and the White House. 3 7
On December 24, 1992, six years after the commencement of the inde-
pendent counsel investigations,' President Bush extended pardons to
former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and to five other figures
involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. 39
B. President Bush's Rationale for Granting the Pardons
In granting clemency to six former Reagan administration officials,
President Bush offered several justifications for the pardons. First, Bush
understated President Reagan's personal responsibility for the scandal. The Tower Report
substantially contradicted the White House's story that Lt. Col. Oliver North ran this oper-
ation without the knowledge or authorization of his superiors. See id., Appendices B, C, D;
see also Banks, supra note 127, at 292.
134. Such an appointment is authorized by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1867 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599
(1988). Lawrence Walsh was appointed by the Attorney General as independent counsel to
investigate and, if necessary, prosecute those officials who were involved in the Iran-Contra
Affair. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1987) (holding that the independent counsel
law is valid because it limited the roles of Congress and the judiciary in the functioning of
the independent counsel, in addition to maintaining adequate executive branch authority
over the prosecutorial function).
135. Walsh, former president of the American Bar Association and former Manhattan
federal judge, was appointed counsel in charge of the Iran-Contra investigation on Decem-
ber 19, 1986. AMERICA AND THE WORLD, supra note 133, at 653.
136. Robert L. Jackson and Ronald J. Ostrow, Bush Pardons Weinberger, 5 Others in
Iran-Contra, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al. Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of De-
fense and Duane R. "Dewey" Clarridge, former CIA agent and former head of CIA covert
operations in Latin America, received pardons while awaiting trial. Clair E. George, former
CIA official, Robert C. McFarlane, former National Security Advisor, Elliot Abrams, former
Assistant Secretary of State, and Alan D. Fiers, Jr., head of the CIA's Central American
Task Force, all were found guilty and subsequently pardoned. Carl R. "Spitz" Channell, a
fund raiser for conservative causes, Richard R. Miller, a conservative publicist, Albert A.
Hakim, the financial organizer of the scheme, Richard V. Secord, a retired Air Force general,
and Thomas G. Clines, a partner of Hakim and Secord, were found guilty but were not
pardoned. John M. Poindexter, former National Security Advisor, Joseph M. Fernandez,
former CIA station chief in Costa Rica, and Oliver L. North, a central figure in the scheme,
all had their cases dismissed. Evan Thomas, Pardon Me, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 14.
137. Bob Cohn & Ann McDaniel, Anatomy of a Pardon: Why Weinberger Walked,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1993, at 22.
138. See AMERICA AND THE WORLD, supra note 133, at 653. Lawrence E. Walsh was ap-
pointed independent counsel in charge of the Iran arms sales and diversion investigation on
December 19, 1986. Id.
139. President Bush pardoned Caspar Weinberger, Robert McFarlane, Elliott Abrams,
Duane Clarridge, Alan Fiers, and Clair George. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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pardoned Weinberger on grounds of compassion. The President main-
tained that Weinberger and the others were driven by "honor, decency
and fairness," 140 noting that both Weinberger and his wife now suffer
from "debilitating illness."1'
Second, Bush justified the pardon on grounds of prior service, main-
taining that he was "pardoning [Weinberger] not just out of compassion
or to spare a 75-year-old patriot the torment of lengthy and costly legal
proceedings, but to make it possible for him to receive the honor he de-
serves for his extraordinary service to our country." 42 Moreover, Bush
described Weinberger as "a true American patriot" who had served his
country "with great distinction. 1
43
Third, Bush employed a "politics argument" to explain the pardons.
The President claimed that the defendants were being required to pay
criminal penalties for "policy differences"'144 within the Reagan adminis-
tration and that such policy differences should be contested in the "polit-
ical arena.' 4
5
Fourth, President Bush pointed out that "[the former Reagan adminis-
tration officials] did not profit or seek to profit from their conduct."' 46
Bush declined to pardon defendants whose conduct demonstrated any el-
ement of self-aggrandizement, such as Richard Secord or Albert
Hakim. 147
C. Independent Counsel's Reaction to the Pardons
Lawrence Walsh reacted to the announcement that President Bush had
pardoned Weinberger and five other former Reagan administration offi-
140. Fred Bruning, The Time Bomb that Ticks for George Bush, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 18,
1993, at 11.
141. Bush Grants 6 Pardons in Iran-Contra; Angry Prosecutor Says He's Investigating
the President, THE Hous. CHRON., Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Senator George Mitchell of Maine labeled the Bush pardons of Weinberger and the
others a mistake. "It is not as the President stated today a matter of criminalizing policy
differences. If members of the executive branch lie to the Congress, obstruct justice and
otherwise break the law, how can policy differences be fairly and legally resolved in a de-
mocracy." David Johnston, Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinberger Trial;
Prosecutor Assails "Cover-Up," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
145. Id. President Bush stated that, "[tihese differences should have been addressed in
the political arena without the Damocles sword of criminality hanging over the heads of
some of the combatants. The proper target is the President, not his subordinates; the proper
forum is the voting booth, not the courtroom." Id.
146. Timothy J. McNulty, Democrats Rap Bush's Pardons in Iran-Contra, CHI. TRI., Dec.
25, 1992, at Ni.
147. Bruce Fein, Bush's Finest Hour: The Courageous Pardons of Iran-Contra, THE RE-
CORDER, Jan. 7, 1993, at 7.
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cials by proclaiming that "[t]he Iran-Contra coverup . ..has now been
completed with the pardon of Caspar Weinberger."' 4 8 Walsh claimed that
by pardoning these officials, Bush was merely protecting himself.149 Wein-
berger was scheduled for trial on January 5, 1993, and might have called
the President as a witness. Walsh believed there was a "conspiracy among
the highest-ranking Reagan administration officials to lie to Congress and
the American people." 150 According to the attorney, the pardon "was part
of a disturbing pattern of deception and obstruction that permeated the
highest levels of the Reagan and Bush administrations."' 151
Walsh further asserted that "I think the pardon has a devastating ef-
fect on the development of further facets of the inquiry, such as we would
have expected in the Weinberger trial."'' Moreover, he added that the
President is "the subject now of our investigation."' 53
D. The Iran-Contra Pardons: Impetus to Reform Presidential Pardon-
ing Powers
An examination of the pardons extended by President Bush to the six
former Reagan administration officials reveals the harm that can result
from the exercise of unfettered presidential clemency power. Because
President Bush extended the pardons as a lame duck president, he did
not face the electorate."5 The direct consequence of these pardons may
be the suppression of vital information concerning the possible miscon-
duct of President Bush and other top executive branch officials.
The pretrial pardons have effectively suppressed information that
might have been revealed during the Weinberger trial. In turn, this infor-
mation might have implicated both Presidents Bush and Reagan. Fur-
thermore, the pardons insulated other executive officials from further in-
vestigation. Due to these pardons, the public has been left with the
incomplete conclusions reached by the Tower Commission'55 and congres-
148. Jonathan Schell, There's No Pardon in the People's Court, NEWSDAY, (Nassau) Dec.
31, 1992, at 95.
149. Patrick Brogan, Bush's Iran-Contra Pardons Stymie Prosecutor; Walsh Accuses
President of Protecting Himself but Can Only Write His Report, THE GAZETTE, (Montreal)
Dec. 30, 1992, at A8.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Patrick Cockburn, Iran-Contra Inquiry Targets President, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec.
27, 1992, at 1.
153. Robert L. Jackson and Ronald J. Ostrow, Bush Pardons Weinberger, 5 Others in
Iran-Contra; Act Called Cover-Up, THE L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
154. Silent Pardoner, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1993, at 8.
155. Concerning Vice President Bush, the Tower Commission report stated:
There is no evidence that the Vice President was aware of the diversion. The Vice
President attended several meetings on the Iran initiative, but none of the partici-
pants could recall his views.
[Vol. 27:345
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER
sional investigations. 1 5 Although the pardons have generated intense
short-term scrutiny from the media and Congress, the plethora of policy
issues competing for the public's attention eventually will cause the con-
troversy to recede into the background.
Since there are limited mechanisms for maintaining, accountability and
control over the executive branch, 5 ' the president should not be permit-
ted to unilaterally preempt the discovery of damaging information by
pardoning executive staff members. The broad scope of the pardon power
creates grave risks that the democratic process can be subverted through
the discretionary and potentially self-serving actions of the president.
The pardons of Weinberger and the other Reagan administration offi-
cials illustrate two harms in permitting unfettered presidential discretion.
First, by depriving the public of information, the president eliminates a
prerequisite for the functioning of an accountable democratic govern-
ment. The use of the presidential pardon deprives the public and other
branches of government of the opportunity to hold their government
accountable.
Second, discretionary use of the pardon prevents reform of the gov-
erning system. One strength of the American democratic system of gov-
ernment is its flexibility. However, presidential pardons prevent identifi-
cation of problems, thus hindering the improvement of government
policies and structures.
V. AN ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE ABUSE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDONING
POWERS: RECOMMENDED PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS
As illustrated by George Bush's Christmas Eve pardons and his result-
ing escape from accountability for possible misconduct in the Iran-Contra
scandal, authority already vested in Congress 58 and the federal judici-
The Vice President said he did not know of the Contra resupply operation. His
National Security Advisor, Donald Gregg, was told in early August 1986 by a former
colleague that North was running the Contra resupply operation, and that ex-associ-
ates of Edwin Wilson - a well known ex-CIA official convicted of selling arms to
Libya and plotting the murder of his prosecutors - were involved in the operation.
Gregg testified that he did not consider these facts worthy of the Vice President's
attention and did not report them to him, even after the Hasenfus airplane was shot
down and the Administration had denied any connection with it.
CoMMurrEE REPORT, supra note 126, at 21.
156. Michigan Democrat Senator Carl Levin said that "the right place to present this
material is in court. That's where it should have been presented - not in the media, not in
a congressional hearing, ideally, but in court." Walter Pincus, Senate Panel May Question
Weinberger; Lawbreaker Wants to Examine Iran-Contra Case, Pardons, THE Hous.
CHRON., Dec. 28, 1992, at Al.
157. These mechanisms are found in the legislative and judicial branches. See supra"
notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
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ary' 59 has not adequately checked the exercise of executive clemency
power. Therefore, other mechanisms must be implemented to ensure
presidential accountability. The adoption of the following two mecha-
nisms would restrict the executive clemency powers and result in in-
creased presidential accountability: first, withholding pardons until after
trial, conviction, and sentencing;16 0 and second, granting pardons only for
specified offenses.
A. Pardons Only After Trial, Sentencing, and Conviction
The first option is to withhold pardons until after a criminal trial, con-
viction, and sentencing.'6 1 The idea of withholding a pardon until after
conviction is not new. Luther Martin, a Maryland delegate at the federal
Constitutional Convention of 1787, 16 proposed such an idea at the Con-
vention, but withdrew the suggestion after an objection was made.'
159. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
160. However, some language found in Supreme Court cases approves the practice of
granting preconviction pardons. "The Executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after
their commission, either before trial, during trial, or after trial, by individuals, or by classes,
conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress."
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925).
161. Limiting the exercise of the pardoning power until after conviction, trial, and sen-
tencing would not result in a dramatic change in general pardoning practices. In fact, The
Congressional Quarterly reported that, "of the 2,314 paidons granted by Presidents Ken-
nedy, Johnson, and Nixon, it appears that only three preceded conviction." 32 THE CON-
GRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 2458 (no. 37, September 14, 1974). Although the
impact of restricting the issuance of pardoning power to postconviction would be minimal in
ordinary pardons, its effect on pardons for executive branch personnel or pardons in which
the president has a self-interest would be great. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying
text.
162. S. Doc. No. 34, 100th Cong., 2d Seass., 1431 (1989). Luther Martin, former Attorney
General of Maryland, was elected to the Continental Congress in 1774 but did not attend.
Martin represented Maryland as a member of the Federal Constitutional Convention in
1787. Id.
163. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 350-51 (1975). Ac-
cording to a journal kept by James Madison at the federal Convention, the proposal and its
withdrawal by Martin occurred as follows:
Two days later, on August 27, 1787, a suggestion was made that the President
should have the authority to grant a pardon only after the offender had been con-
victed. That suggestion was quickly withdrawn, however, after an objection was made
to it:
Monday, August 27th, 1787
In Convention, . . . Article 10, Section 2, being resumed, ..
Mr. L. Martin moved to insert the words, "after conviction," after the words, "reprieves
and pardons."
Mr. Wilson objected, that pardon before conviction might be necessary, in order to obtain
the testimony of accomplices. He stated the case of forgeries, in which this might particu-
larly happen.
Mr. L. Martin withdrew his motion.
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If the post-trial pardoning recommendation had been implemented
before the Bush pardons of Weinberger and the other Iran-Contra de-
fendants, it would have enabled the prosecution and defense to investi-
gate and publicize any information relevant to allegations of executive
misconduct. Because Bush pardoned Weinberger and the other Iran-Con-
tra defendants before trial, important information concerning President
Bush's possible misconduct in the Iran-Contra scandal will never surface
in a court of law. The operation of the criminal judicial process would
place the courts in a stronger position to order the president and his sub-
ordinates to reveal relevant information"' and thus increase executive
accountability.
The president might still attempt to subvert the process and avoid re-
vealing damaging information by ordering a subordinate to plead guilty
before receiving a pardon. However, certain factors would make even this
situation more desirable than the current opportunities for preemptive
pardons. First, the defendant might resist pleading guilty in order to
avoid the public stigma that results from admitting criminal miscon-
duct.16 5 In addition, although the acceptance of a pardon arguably implies
an admission of guilt, mere confession of culpability will not adequately
advance executive accountability. Judges, before accepting a guilty plea,
must ensure that the defendant understands and acknowledges the crimi-
nal acts committed. Therefore, before accepting pleas, the judge asks
questions of the defendant in open court to elicit information concerning
the crimes at issue and guard against collusion. If there are doubts about
the veracity of the defendant's testimony, the judge need not accept the
plea of guilty, which would prevent the application of the pardon and
force the defendant either to be more forthcoming in responding to ques-
tions or else face a complete trial. The end result provides the public with
greater access to information about executive branch misconduct. The
president's ability to hide wrongdoing also would be greatly reduced.
B. Pardons Only for Specified Crimes
A second method of rendering the president more accountable for his
exercise of the pardoning power would be the implementation of a re-
Id. (citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES, at 621 (Tansill ed., 1927).
164. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974), the Supreme Court observed
that "the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh [assertions of] Presidential
privilege." Id.
165. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. One commentator has noted that
"[c]ontrary to popular belief, a pardon does not obliterate the record or stigma of a convic-
tion, nor does it establish the innocence of the person. It merely forgives the offense." Chris-
topher C. Joyner, Rethinking the President's Power of Executive Pardon, 43 FED. PROBA-
TION 16, 20 (1979).
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
quirement that the president specify charges when granting clemency.
The primary benefit of such a requirement would be that the specific mis-
deeds cited in the pardon would be subject to the close investigative scru-
tiny of the media and Congress. This is especially important in view of
the inability to examine the specified misdeeds through the criminal jus-
tice process. Moreover, unspecified charges would remain fair targets for
prosecution. Thus, the president would risk subsequent damaging revela-
tions by an attempt to hide crimes with statements omitting specific ref-
erences within the pardon proclamation. Although the public would not
necessarily receive complete or accurate information, executive accounta-
bility would be enhanced because the president would be required to de-
scribe the misconduct specifically when issuing a pardon to executive
branch personnel.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present construction of presidential clemency powers presents a
significant risk that a president may employ the power to conceal crimi-
nal activity within the executive branch. Indeed, President Bush has been
able to escape accountability for his actions in the Iran-Contra scandal
because of the pardoning power. Current accountability mechanisms in
the federal system have not sufficiently monitored the president's use of
this important power. Therefore, formal congressional or judicial limita-
tions upon this clemency power would benefit the governing system by
facilitating public access to information concerning possible misdeeds by
the president and executive branch subordinates. Although any attempt
to limit presidential power will generate considerable political opposition,
the Iran-Contra scandal has illustrated the serious threat of a presidential
pardon which could thwart full disclosure of wrongdoing within the exec-
utive branch. Lest the lessons of the Reagan and Bush administrations
repeat themselves in another presidential administration, perhaps with
even more damaging effects, the clemency powers of the president should
be limited in regard to executive branch officials in order to ensure execu-
tive accountability to the electorate.
James N. Jorgensen
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